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Abstract
This paper assesses the degree of downward wage rigidity in Luxem-
bourg using an administrative monthly data set on individual wages cov-
ering the entire economy over the period from January 2001 to January
2007. After limiting for measurement error, which would otherwise bias
downwards the estimates of wage rigidity, we conclude that nearly all
workers in Luxembourg are potentially subject to downward real wage
rigidity. Our results are robust to diﬀerent procedures to adjust for mea-
surement error and methods for estimation of downward wage rigidity. We
report relatively small diﬀerences in the frequency of nominal wage cuts
across occupational groups and sectors. In addition, the observed rigid-
ity does not seem to be driven predominantly by the absence of negative
shocks. We show that the real wage rigidity is related to the automatic
wage indexation, while additional factors might be necessary to explain
t h eh i g hd e g r e eo fdownward wage rigidity.
JEL Code: J31.
Keywords: downward wage rigidity, wage indexation.5
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Non-technical summary
Wage rigidity captures growing interest of both policymakers and economists.
On theoretical grounds, it causes unemployment by limiting the adjustment of
wages and is often put forward as one of the explanations of high and persis-
tent unemployment in Europe when compared to the US (Grubb et al. (1983)).
Wage rigidity has also important implications for the design and eﬀectiveness of
monetary policy. Since moderate inﬂation allows for reductions in real wages,
the optimal level of inﬂation is higher when nominal wages are rigid, all else
equal (Akerlof et al. (1996)).
While economic theory is unambiguous with regard to the role of wage
rigidities, an empirical assessment of their strength remains an open question.
Macroeconomic studies typically estimate the sensitivity of wages to shocks
or changes in unemployment and/or productivity. The microeconomic line of
research rests on the idea that wage rigidity causes asymmetries in the wage
change distribution. For instance a spike in the wage change distribution at
zero (close to the expected inﬂation) is considered as an indicator of downward
nominal (real) wage rigidity.
Empirical estimates of the degree of downward wage rigidity vary not only
across countries and approaches but also between diﬀerent datasets referring to
the same country (such as employment registers, household or employer sur-
veys). First, labour market institutions were put forward as a potential source
of wage rigidity. For instance Holden and Wulfsberg (2009) show that the fre-
quency of real wage cuts is lower in countries with strict employment protection
legislation and high unionization. Second, diﬀerent estimates of wage rigidity
obtained in datasets referring to one country can be due to measurement errors
(Gottschalk (2005)). As a result, several approaches to deal with measurement
errors were proposed in the literature.
This paper was conducted within the Eurosystem’s Wage Dynamics Net-
work. It provides estimates of downward nominal and real wage rigidity for
Luxembourg. We use an administrative dataset with monthly frequency cov-
ering the entire economy over the period from January 2001 to January 2007.
While Lünnemann and Wintr (2009) provide evidence on the ﬂexibility of wages
in Luxembourg by calculating the frequency of wage change, this paper directly
estimates downward wage rigidity in Luxembourg and compares the results
to other countries. We adopt two sets of rigidity estimates developed in the
framework of the International Wage Flexibility Project (IWFP hereafter), see
Dickens et al. (2007) and Dickens et al. (2008). We extend the literature in
several ways. First, we provide estimates of downward rigidity for Luxembourg,
which not only has not participated in the IWFP so far, but also features a
number of distinctive institutional labour market characteristics (such as the
automatic wage indexation). Second, in order to assess the robustness of our
estimates, a cross-check is provided using alternative measures of wage rigidity
and approaches to identify measurement error. Third, while the IWFP proce-
dure is typically used to derive estimates of downward rigidity for the aggregate
economy (Dickens et al. (2008)) or selected sectors (Messina et al. (2010)), in6
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addition, we investigate whether the degree of downward wage rigidity diﬀers
across occupational groups, sectors and ﬁrms.
Our main ﬁndings can be summarized as follows. First, the dataset is subject
to two main types of measurement error that can substantially bias downward
the measured degree of downward wage rigidity. While the raw data suggest
that nominal wage cuts are not uncommon, we ﬁnd few nominal wage cuts once
adjusting for measurement error.
Second, we ﬁnd an overall very high degree of downward real wage rigidity.
We observe a strong concentration of wage changes in the 2–3% interval (which
includes the 2.5% wage increase stipulated by the automatic wage indexation).
At the same time, wage changes below 2% are rare. As a consequence, our
estimates suggest that nearly all workers in Luxembourg are potentially subject
to downward real wage rigidity, a higher level than in any other country partic-
ipating in the IWFP.
Third, these results are robust to the procedure used to adjust for measure-
ment error and two diﬀerent methods for estimation of downward wage rigidity
that we adopt.
Fourth, we observe only relatively small diﬀerences in the frequency of wage
cuts across occupational groups and sectors which have to be considered against
the low frequency of wage cuts in Luxembourg. In addition, we show that in
spite of very diﬀerent dynamics of employment and wage bill at the company
level, which suggests that the observed downward real wage rigidity is due to
factors covering essentially the whole economy, such as labour market institu-
tions, and is not driven predominantly by the absence of negative shocks. We
show that the automatic indexation has signiﬁcant implications on the distri-
bution of wage changes and downward real wage rigidity.7
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1 Introduction
Wage rigidity captures growing interest of both policymakers and economists.
It causes unemployment by limiting the adjustment of wages and thus inﬂicts
substantial social costs. This is especially relevant in a monetary union in which
alternative channels of adjustment might be more costly (De Grauwe (2007)).
Wage rigidity was put forward as one of the explanations of high and persistent
unemployment in Europe when compared to the US (Grubb et al. (1983)). It
has also important implications for the design and eﬀectiveness of monetary
policy. The optimal level of inﬂation is ceteris paribus higher when nominal
wages are rigid because moderate inﬂation allows for reductions in real wages
(“grease” eﬀect, see e.g. Akerlof et al. (1996)). Real wage rigidity introduces a
trade-oﬀ between stabilizing inﬂation and the output gap in the New Keynesian
model and induces persistence in inﬂation and output gap ﬂuctuations that are
observed in the data (Blanchard and Galí (2007)). It was suggested that wage
rigidity can be one of the causes of price stickiness, which in turn exacerbates
output volatility in response to shocks and requires larger interest rate changes
to inﬂuence inﬂation (Altissimo et al. (2006)).
While economic theory is unambiguous with regard to the role of wage
rigidities, an empirical assessment of their strength remains an open question.
Macroeconomic studies typically estimate the sensitivity of wages to shocks or
changes in unemployment and/or productivity. The microeconomic line of re-
search rests on the idea that wage rigidity causes asymmetries in the wage change
distribution. Dickens et al. (2008) interpret the presence of spikes at zero wage
growth and expected wage increases as indicators of downward nominal and
real wage rigidity, respectively, assuming that in the absence of downward wage
rigidity the distribution of wage changes is symmetric and that the eﬀects of
rigidity can be seen only under the median. Kahn (1997) assumes that in the
absence of rigidity, certain properties of the distribution of wage changes remain
constant over time. The measure of wage rigidity is based on a comparison of
the height of bins at a given distance from the median in years when they refer
to wage cuts and in years when rigidity is not binding (wage increases). Another
strand of the microeconomic estimates of wage rigidity is based on the assump-
tion that there is a hypothetical distribution of wage changes that would prevail
if there was no rigidity (notional distribution). Measures of wage rigidity can
then be obtained from the comparison of the notional and observed distribution
as in Dickens et al. (2007) or Altonji and Devereux (1999).
Empirical work estimating the degree of downward wage rigidity has pro-
vided vast but sometimes inconclusive results so far. The reported degree of
downward wage rigidity varies not only across diﬀerent approaches and coun-
tries but also between diﬀerent datasets referring to the same country (such as
employment registers, household or employer surveys). According to Gottschalk
(2005), the results can be due to the presence of measurement error. He as-
sumes that the measurement error-free base wage trajectory is a step function
and identiﬁes true wage changes as structural breaks in the reported base wage
series. Alternative approaches assume a speciﬁc functional form of the mea-
surement error distribution or make other distributional assumptions (Altonji8
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and Devereux (1999)). Other papers (e.g. Card and Hyslop (1996) and Akerlof
et al. (1996)) rely on validation studies conducted by Bound and Krueger (1991)
which provide estimates of the ratio of the variance of the error component to
the variance of reported wages. Dickens et al. (2007) and Dickens et al. (2008)
remove autocorrelation in wage changes based on the assumption that measure-
ment error introduces negative autocorrelation in wage changes.
This paper provides estimates of downward nominal and real wage rigidity
for Luxembourg based on an administrative dataset with monthly frequency
covering the period between January 2001 and January 2007. We provide esti-
mates of both nominal and real downward wage rigidity. However, we focus on
the latter because previous research suggested that it might be especially rele-
vant in a country with full automatic wage indexation. While Lünnemann and
Wintr (2009) provide evidence on the ﬂexibility of wages in Luxembourg by cal-
culating the frequency of wage change, this paper directly estimates downward
wage rigidity in Luxembourg and compares the results to other countries. The
frequency of wage change might provide a misleading indicator of wage rigidity
because it depends, among others, on inﬂation and its expectations. We adopt
two sets of rigidity estimates that attempt to limit these shortcomings and pro-
vide comparable results over time and across countries. More speciﬁcally, we
follow the methodology developed by the International Wage Flexibility Project
(IWFP hereafter), see Dickens et al. (2007) and Dickens et al. (2008).1
We extend the literature in several ways. First, we provide estimates of
downward rigidity for Luxembourg, which not only has not participated in the
IWFP so far, but also features a number of distinctive institutional labour mar-
ket characteristics. Labour market institutions have been put forward as a
potential source of wage rigidity (Holden and Wulfsberg (2009), Dickens et al.
(2008)). Second, in order to assess the robustness of our estimates, a cross-
check is provided based on two alternative measures to identify measurement
error which, contrary to the IWFP procedure, make full use of the monthly
frequency of the dataset. Third, while the IWFP procedure is typically used
to derive estimates of downward rigidity for the aggregate economy or selected
sectors (Messina et al. (2010) and Dickens et al. (2008)), in addition, we inves-
tigate whether the degree of downward wage rigidity diﬀers across occupational
groups, sectors and ﬁrms. We concentrate on job stayers and our ideal measure
of wage is hourly base wage in order to facilitate international comparison.
Our main ﬁndings can be summarized as follows. First, the dataset is subject
to two main types of measurement error that can substantially bias downward
the measured degree of downward wage rigidity. While the raw data suggest
that nominal wage cuts are not uncommon (overall roughly 7.7% of all y-o-y
wage changes in the raw data set), we ﬁnd few nominal wage cuts once adjusting
for measurement error (2.0–3.6% of all y-o-y wage changes).
1It is impossible to follow with our dataset the line of research started by Kahn (1997),
recently extended by Christoﬁdes and Nearchou (2007), because it requires substantial varia-
tion in inﬂation rate during the sample period. The same holds for the approach of Holden
and Wulfsberg (2007b). NICP inﬂation in Luxembourg ranged from 2% to 2.7% between 2001
and 2007.9
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Second, we ﬁnd an overall very high degree of downward real wage rigid-
ity (DRWR), with 2.3–5.4% of all y-o-y wage changes being below 2% wage
increases.2 Our estimates suggest that nearly all workers in Luxembourg are
potentially subject to downward real wage rigidity. The degree of DRWR in
Luxembourg seems to be substantially higher than in all other countries stud-
ied within the IWFP so far. Even though Holden and Wulfsberg (2007b) obtain
a much lower estimate of DRWR for Luxembourg, their estimate too, is the
highest among the 19 OECD countries included in their study. As a mirror
image of the strong DRWR, downward nominal wage rigidity does not play im-
portant role in Luxembourg.
Third, these results are robust to the procedure used to adjust for mea-
surement error and the two diﬀerent methods for estimation of downward wage
rigidity that we adopt.
Fourth, we observe only relatively small diﬀerences in the frequency of nom-
inal wage cuts across occupational groups and sectors that are not signiﬁcant
in most cases or can be related to speciﬁc deﬁciencies of a particular method.
In addition, we show that in spite of very diﬀerent dynamics at the company
level, there is no robust relationship between the fraction of (real and nominal)
wage cuts and ﬁrm’s growth (as proxied by the growth rate in total wage bill
and head count). This suggests that the observed downward real wage rigidity
is not driven predominantly by the absence of negative shocks.
Our results suggest that the high degree of downward real wage rigidity ob-
served in Luxembourg is primarily due to factors covering essentially the whole
economy, such as labour market institutions. We show that the spike in the
wage change histogram in the interval 2% to 3% is related to the automatic
wage indexation which in eﬀect contributes to the downward real wage rigid-
ity. We cannot exclude that additional factors might be necessary to explain the
high degree of downward nominal wage rigidity. Preliminary evidence from a re-
cent survey among Luxembourg ﬁrms suggests that labour regulation/collective
agreements are among the most important reasons preventing wage cuts in Lux-
embourg.
The paper is organised in four sections. Section 2 discusses the institutional
characteristics of the Luxembourg labour market with a special focus on the
automatic wage indexation mechanism and the statutory minimum wage. Sec-
tion 3 describes the dataset, discusses two main types of measurement error
and deﬁnes the relevant wage measure. In section 4, we propose three measures
to reduce measurement error and describe the two sets of downward rigidity
estimates developed by the IWFP. Our results with regard to the degree of
downward wage rigidity are presented in Section 5 including ﬁndings for the en-
tire economy, occupational groups, sectors and across ﬁrms. Section 6 concludes.
2The automatic wage indexation stipulates 2.5% wage increases.10
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2 The Luxembourg labour market in a nutshell
Recent research has demonstrated the role of the institutional settings of labour
markets on wage rigidities (Dickens et al. (2007)). While the Luxembourg labour
market shares certain characteristics with a number of other countries, it does
feature some distinctive properties with potentially important implications for
the presence/strength of downward wage rigidity. For example, Du Caju et al.
(2008) and OECD (2009) report a high trade union density in Luxembourg
relative to western European countries and a strongly decentralized wage bar-
gaining process. More importantly, however, coordination of wage bargaining
in Luxembourg is economy-wide predominantly achieved through full-automatic
state-imposed wage indexation and statutory minimum wages, a combination
rarely seen in other industrialised economies.3 Details of the wage indexation
mechanism and the statutory minimum wage are provided in sections 2.1 and
2.2, respectively.
2.1 Automatic wage indexation
Du Caju et al. (2008) report that some form of wage indexation exists in vari-
ous European countries (e.g. Belgium, Cyprus, the Czech Republic and Slove-
nia), but their scope is rarely as broad as in the case of Luxembourg where
wage indexation is the dominant coordination mechanism in the wage bargain-
ing process. In Luxembourg, wage indexation is state-imposed, applies to all
wages and pensions and, for most of the period under study (namely from 2001
to mid-2006), had been applied entirely automatically. The state-imposed wage
indexation mechanism being entirely backward-looking, it stipulates an increase
in all wages and pensions the month after the 6-month moving average of the
national index of consumer prices (NICP hereafter) increased by 2.5% relative
to its level at the time of the preceding wage indexation event.4 Importantly,
the wage indexation mechanism makes no distinction with regard to the sources
of inﬂation. Regardless of the sources underlying, increases in the general price
level are fully passed through to wages in the event of wage indexation.5 During
the period under study, wage indexation kicked in six times, with one occurence
3For more details on the Luxembourg labour market from an institutional perspective see
Lünnemann and Wintr (2009).
4Changes in a small number of prices included in the NICP, however, are not taken into
account within the framework of the wage indexation mechanism.
5In 2006, the Government decided to no longer apply the wage indexation mechanism in its
purely mechanical form over the period 2006-2009 and introduced an amendment (modulation
hereafter) governing the implementation of automatic wage indexation over this period. The
amendmend reﬂected concerns of (shrinking) competitiveness against the background of rapid
increases in oil prices. In an eﬀort to ﬁx a ceiling to the frequency of wage indexation events
over the period 2006-2009, when introduced in 2006, the modulation excluded any further
wage indexation prior to December 2006 regardless of actual developments in the price level.
In December 2006, wages were indexed by 2.5%, i.e. a rate inferior to the increase in the
general price level observed since the preceding event of wage indexation (i.e. October 2005).
While the modulation has not aﬀected the rate by which wages are changed in the event of
indexation, given the fairly high inﬂation rates observed in 2006, it might have had an impact
on wage negotiations and wage setting behaviour in more general. However, the amendment
has been introduced in mid-2006 only, probably after standard collective wage agreements had
been concluded.11
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per calendar year and a 12-14 months duration between two consecutive index-
ation events.6
While the event of automatic wage indexation is exogenous to the individ-
ual ﬁrm, agents know the size of the wage adjustments due to indexation and
they can broadly anticipate their timing. The actual level of the NICP is reg-
ularly published by the national statistical institute Statec. In addition, both
Statec and the Banque centrale du Luxembourg publish inﬂation forecasts twice
a year. Moreover, the wage indexation mechanism often being considered a
key element of the Luxembourg model, the prospects for an upcoming round of
wage indexation are widely discussed in the national press. While the impact
of wage indexation on wages is obvious, survey evidence suggests a strong link
with prices. For example, Lünnemann and Mathä (2006) report that ﬁrms in
the services sector consider wage indexation the second most important reason
for price increases. According to their 2008 survey among Luxembourg ﬁrms
(Lünnemann and Mathä (2010)), 42% of all ﬁrms conﬁrm a direct link between
wage changes due to indexation and price increases.7
2.2 Statutory minimum wage
The minimum wage is another corner stone of wage coordination in Luxem-
bourg. Similar to the automatic wage indexation mechanism, the scope of the
minimum wage in Luxembourg is particularly broad and relies on a strong legal
framework. Though some form of minimum wages is in application in various
industrialised countries (for an overview see, for example, Du Caju et al. (2008)),
in Luxembourg the minimum wage is legally binding and extends to all sectors
of the economy. The statutory minimum wage level imposed is identical for all
sectors and, in general, there is no distinction according to tenure. However, a
20% (25%) hair cut is applied to the wages of young workers in the age of 17
(age of 15 and 16) and a 20% premium is applied in the case of qualiﬁed workers.
As reported in Du Caju et al. (2008) and EIRO (2009), the minimum wage level
in Luxembourg is fairly high and so is the proportion of workers covered by the
minimum wage regime (between 10 and 20%).8
The minimum wage is deﬁned in terms of an hourly wage rate. At the end
of the sample period, the minimum wage was approximately EUR 9.1 for un-
skilled workers aged 18 or more. Similar to all other salaries and pensions, the
minimum wage is subject to automatic wage indexation. However, changes to
the minimum wage not only result from wage indexation, but also from the
6Wage indexations occured in April 2001, June 2002, August 2003, October 2004, October
2005 and December 2006.
7While the majority of the ﬁrms rejected the idea of automatic wage indexation directly
leading to price increases, the share of ﬁrms conﬁrming a direct link in the case of wage
increase due to indexation is substantially higher than in the case of wage increases stipulated
by collective wage agreements (22%) or due to other promotions (21%). A higher acceptance
ratio with regard to a direct link to the ﬁrm’s price is obtained for rising commodity prices
only (52%).
8According to Du Caju et al. (2008), the proportion of workers subject to minimum wage
enforcement is 10% or lower in most countries operating statutory minimum wages.12
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Government’s bi-annual assessment of productivity gains and developments in
real salaries over the past two years. During the sample period, the Government
raised the statutory minimum wage (for reasons other than indexation) on four
occasions, i.e. in January 2001 (+3.1%), in January 2003 (+3.5%), in January
2005 (+2.1%) and in January 2007 (+1.9%).
2.3 Other coordination mechanisms
While there are coordination mechanisms other than wage indexation and the
statutory minimum wage, they are not dominant in the case of Luxembourg
and/or not materially diﬀerent from the mechanisms in operation in other
economies and already dealt with in other studies. According to Du Caju et al.
(2008), coordination is mainly achieved at the “intra-associational” level.9 By
contrast, they ﬁnd that “inter-associational coordination”10 and pattern bar-
gaining do not apply in Luxembourg. Du Caju et al. (2008) report an average
duration of collective wage agreements of roughly two years. Similar to many
other countries, there is a strong seasonal pattern in the timing of such collec-
tive wage agreements in Luxembourg. Wage negotiations typically start around
the turn of the year and agreements are reached within the ﬁrst quarter of the
following year. However, some sectors may exhibit diﬀerent seasonal patterns.11
Pre-expiry renegotiations are not uncommon in Industry, Market services and
Non-market services sectors, in particular when facing periods of slower growth
and rising concerns about competitiveness.
3 Dataset and variables
3.1 Baseline dataset
This paper uses data on individual salaries and hours worked as reported by
employers on behalf of their employees and compiled by the Luxembourg social
security authority (Inspection G´ en´ erale de la S´ ecurit´ e Sociale, IGSS hereafter).
With more than 22 million observations, the dataset reports monthly salaries
for more than 475 000 employees aﬃliated with more than 46 000 employers
representing more than 845 000 occupations covering all sectors of the economy
over the period from January 2001–January 2007.12 In 2006, the aggregate vol-
ume of base salary reported in the dataset was roughly 11.4 bn EUR, an amount
equivalent to more than 33% of GDP.
9I.e. wage bargaining is primarily undertaken at the level of umbrella organisations of
employers and trade unions. According to Du Caju et al. (2008), “intra-associational coordi-
nation” is the dominant form of coordination in a number of countries.
10I.e. wage bargaining is undertaken at the national level or via cross-sector agreements.
11The actual timing of the wage bargaining process may lag behind the above seasonal
pattern in case an agreement is particularly diﬃcult to ﬁnd. This applies in particular to the
sectors Industry, Market services and Non-market services. In such cases, agreements are
often applied retrospectively and/or include one-oﬀ payments.
12The dataset does not provide information on oﬃcials aﬃliated with the local EU institu-
tions, such as the European Court of Justice, the European Court of Auditors, the European
Commission and the European Investment Bank.13
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Even though our analysis primarily uses data on the monthly salary and the
number of hours worked, we also make use of auxiliary information included in
the dataset, such as the occupational group (blue-collar workers, white-collar
workers and civil servants), the age of the employee, the NACE sector of the
employer, the total number of employees per ﬁrm, etc. For the purpose of this
paper, we remove observations that either cannot be used (e.g. due to missing
information) or are clearly not representative of the Luxembourg labour market.
For example:
1. We remove observations with missing information on the monthly salary,
the sector, the number of hours worked, the occupational group, the age
etc. Overall, this leads to a mere 0.2% reduction in the number of obser-
vations. The impact is largest for blue-collar workers (roughly 0.3%) and
smallest for civil servants (less than 0.1%);
2. We remove observations on the basis of speciﬁc ﬁrm characteristics, i.e.
ﬁrms belonging to the sectors Domestic activities and Extraterritorial bod-
ies. This yields a 2.9% reduction in the overall number of observations.
The structure of employment in these sectors not being representative of
the weight of the three occupational groups in the total workforce, the
reduction in the number of observations is relatively high for blue-collar
workers (-6.0%) while the number of observations remains unchanged in
the case of civil servants;
3. We remove observations on the basis of speciﬁc characteristics of the em-
ployee, i.e. observations referring to very young (i.e. below 18 years) or
elderly people (aged 60 or more). This leads to a 1.4% reduction in the
total number of observations. The largest reduction is observed for civil
servants (-2.0%). For blue-collar workers and white-collar workers the
impact is of similar magnitude (-1.4% and -1.3%, respectively);
4. We remove observations on the basis of speciﬁc properties of the job
spell13, e.g. in case the number of hours worked per month is less than 40
hours or whenever the implied hourly wage rate falls below the minimum
wage. In addition, we remove individual observations in case the monthly
salary is likely to include overtime compensation.14 We cannot exclude
the presence of overtime compensation whenever the number of hours
worked reported exceeds the number of norm hours, whether ﬁxed (173
hours per month for full-time staﬀ) or variable (i.e. number of workdays
13Hereafter, a job spell is deﬁned as a unique relationship between any given employee
i and any given employer j. Whenever a relationship between employee i and employer j
is interrupted for one month (or longer) and resumed later on, an additional job spell is
generated. The term wage trajectory is to describe the series of monthly wage observations
characterising a unique job spell.
14Empirical work on wage rigidities typically focuses on the base wage. Considering overtime
remuneration is likely to understate the true degree of wage ﬂexibility (for an illustration see,
for example, Section 3.2.2 below). Variation in the number of overtime hours may lead not
only to changes in the monthly salary for hourly workers, but also to a diﬀerent average hourly
wage rate in case overtime hours are remunerated at rates other than those applied to normal
work hours (e.g. Sundays, night work).14
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times eight for full-time staﬀ).15 16 In addition, we remove observations
referring to simultaneous job spells (i.e. an employee maintaining two or
more jobs with the same company at the same time) as these jobs are
not reliably distinguishable from the information in the dataset. The job
spell is entirely removed whenever its duration (in-sample) is shorter than
25 months. These measures have important implications for the size and
the structure of the dataset, implying a reduction of the number of obser-
vations by half. While we observe a substantial reduction in the case of
blue-collar workers (-76.3%, the impact remains moderate in the case of
civil servants (-4.0%).
While in general, the impact of the above measures remains moderate, two
single measures bear particularly important implications for the size and the
structure of the dataset. The strongest reduction in the number of observations
and the largest change in the structure of the dataset by status is due to the
25-months duration minimum requirement for job spells.17 Roughly 2.7 million
observations are dropped by eliminating observations obviously subject to over-
time work.18 In spite of their substantial impact, we consider these measures
important, clearly improving our estimates of wage rigidity. First, observations
including overtime overtime work may lead to more mean reversion in both the
monthly salary and the hourly wage rate and therefore understate the degree
of wage rigidity. Second, job spells lasting less than 25 months would yield a
single observation for the year-on-year wage change, which is the key variable
when assessing the degree of wage rigidity within the framework of the IWFP.
In sum, the cleaned dataset provides more than 10 million monthly observa-
tions covering more than 190 000 jobs (i.e. -77% compared to the initial dataset)
maintained between almost 185 000 employees (i.e. -61%) and almost 15 000
ﬁrms (i.e. -68%). The impact of the cleaning procedure on the structure of the
dataset of annual wage changes is shown in Table 4 in the Appendix. In par-
ticular, the cleaning procedure leads to an over-representation of white-collar
workers and civil servants, public sector companies, companies with less than 15
employees and in general sectors with a lower proportion of blue-collar workers
(such as Manufacturing and Construction). The number of annual January-to-
January wage changes drops by approximately 46%.
3.2 Measurement error
Microeconomic studies are typically plagued by problems related to measure-
ment error. This is well documented for survey data (e.g. Gottschalk (2005))
15On the deﬁnition of norm hours, see Section 3.2.1.
16While the cut-oﬀ levels are obvious in the case of full-time staﬀ, a similar rule-of-thumb
distinction between overtime hours and regular work time is hardly possible in the case of part-
time staﬀ. For part-time staﬀ we therefore rely on the methods proposed to limit measurement
error (see section 4.2).
17This measure leads to a reduction of almost 4.9 million observations, with more than 25%
of observations lost in the case of blue-collar workers and less than 4% lost in the case of civil
servants.
18Again, the change is particularly important for the category of blue-collar workers (almost
22% reduction in the number of observations) whereas in the case of civil servants the number
of observations is hardly aﬀected (approximately 0.1% reduction).15
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Figure 1: Simulated impact of measurement error due to norm hours
−.1 0 .1 .2 .3
change in log hourly wage
without m.e. m.e. due to norm hours
Salaried workers
Note: The black distribution (without measurement error due to misreported
norm hours) is calibrated on the empirical histogram of changes in salary of
white-collar workers and civil servants. The simulation assumes that 25% of
workers report time-varying norm hours which imply an increase of norm hours
from 168 to 176 (red distribution). The distribution is rescaled and shifted
accordingly.
but it can be the case also in administrative datasets. The dataset used in
this paper is no exception, featuring two main types of measurement error with
important implications for the assessment of downward wage rigidity, namely
unreported overtime hours and misreported hours worked.
3.2.1 Misreported (standard) work hours
While the dataset does provide information on the number of hours worked,
there is no (unique) convention on how to report the number of ordinary work
hours (i.e. excluding overtime hours). While some ﬁrms report the actual num-
ber of hours worked in a given month, others report some form of norm hours.
The number of norm hours reported, in turn, can be ﬁxed (i.e. 173 hours per
month for full-time staﬀ) or time-varying (i.e. the number of workdays in a
given month times eight, which in turn is the regular daily work time in the
case of full-time staﬀ).
In case of hourly workers (and in the absence of overtime hours or short-time
work), the actual hours worked and time-varying norm hours coincide with the
remunerated number of hours and hence both can be used as a denominator in
deriving the hourly base wage from the monthly base pay (excluding bonuses).
However, if the hours reported are constant norm hours, the base wage would
ﬂuctuate from month to month whenever the number of work days changes be-
tween to subsequent months. In case of salaried workers (without remunerated
overtime work), the hourly base wage can be derived correctly by dividing the
base salary by the constant norm hours. If the hours reported reﬂect the actual
number of hours worked (without overtime) or the time-varying norm hours,16
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(b) Hourly workers, 01/2005 − 01/2006
Note: The number of norm hours in January 2005 and January 2006 were 168
and 176, respectively.
both would lead to additional monthly wage changes in the ratio of base salary
to reported hours that do not reﬂect true ﬂexibility of the base wage.
Depending on the proportion of workers with misreported hours, this form of
measurement error can have a substantial impact on the distribution of annual
wage changes. In case of time-varying norm hours being reported for salaried
workers or constant hours being reported for hourly workers, we can actually
predict the bias in the annual wage change histogram because the change in
norm hours is identical for all workers. The situation is illustrated in Figure 1.
First, we assume that the distribution of the change in the hourly base wage
for salaried workers reporting constant norm hours is a left-truncated Weibull
distribution (depicted by the black line in Figure 1).19 The plot depicts the
annual (January-to-January) distribution of hourly base wage changes and the
spike at 2.5% is due to automatic wage indexation. We assume that 25% of
the population of salaried workers report time-varying norm hours and that
there is a diﬀerence of one work day between January in time t and January
in the previous year (e.g. the number of workdays increases from 22 to 23, as
it was the case from 2005 to 2006). For this sub-set of workers, the hourly
wage will be lower by approximately 5% reﬂecting the increase in the hours re-
ported. This implies that the histogram of hourly base wage changes of salaried
workers subject to this type of measurement error will have the same shape as
the histogram of the remaining workers but it will be be shifted to the left (by
approximately 5 percentage points in this example). The red distribution of
wage changes in Figure 1 depicts this situation. The histogram of the change
in the hourly base wage for all salaried workers can be obtained by vertically
summing the two distributions in Figure 1.In fact, the resulting distribution
remarkably resembles the empirical (observed) histogram of the change in the
hourly base wage of salaried workers depicted in Figure 2(a). Figure 3 showing
changes in base salary demonstrates that the spike in the interval (−3%;−2%]
in Figure 2(a) is a mere artefact of measurement error due to misreported hours.
19The reason for this particular choice of the distribution will become apparent later (see
section 4.3.2). However, the argument is general to any distribution.17
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In analogy, for hourly workers who report constant norm hours instead of
the time-varying norm hours (which, in turn, would be the remunerated number
of hours in the absence of overtime hours or short-time work), an increase in
the number of work days would shift the distribution of the hourly wage rate
to the right. Using the same numerical example as above for salaried workers,
we would expect the spike due to wage indexation to appear in the interval
7%–8%. However, the empirical distribution of hourly base wage changes for
hourly workers depicted in Figure 2(b) does not reveal any pronounced spike
in this interval even though one can notice that the bin is slightly higher than
one would expect in a smooth distribution. This suggests that the situation in
which hourly workers report constant norm hours is much less common than
the case of salaried workers reporting time-varying norm hours.
3.2.2 Unreported overtime hours
While the monthly base salary (i.e. excluding bonuses) is reliably recorded in
the dataset and, where applicable, includes overtime compensation, the num-
ber of hours reported do not always incorporate the actual number of overtime
hours. Hence, some of the measured volatility observed in the hourly base wage
can be ascribed to the absence of reliable information on overtime hours worked.
As the number of overtime hours is ﬂuctuating around their mean, unreported
overtime hours tend to understate the true degree of wage rigidity and lead
to a more than proportional increase in the number of wage cuts (assuming
that wage cuts are less frequent than wage increases in the true distribution).
Combined with the eﬀect of wage indexation, this would imply that the true
frequency of wage changes below the (−3%;−2%] interval is even lower than
suggested by the empirical histograms in Figure 2(b) or Figure 3.18
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3.3 Deﬁning wage and wage changes
The focus of the analysis is on the base wage (rather than total wage). While
including bonuses in the deﬁnition of wages would likely increase the measured
degree of wage ﬂexibility, we do not consider bonuses for several reasons. First,
one of our objectives is to provide an estimate of wage rigidity for Luxembourg
and compare it to results obtained for other countries. The relevant literature
focuses on the base wage in order to eliminate potential diﬀerences in wage
rigidity stemming from cross-country diﬀerences in the use of bonuses.20 Sec-
ond, bonuses are not always a form of ﬂexibility from the point of view of the
ﬁrm. They can be stipulated in the collective agreement in the form of the 13th
salary or ﬁxed on the basis of individual or ﬁrm performance. Lastly, survey ev-
idence for Luxembourg suggest that only 35% of ﬁrms reduced bonus payments
when they needed to lower labour costs (Lünnemann and Mathä (2010)).
Moreover, this paper assesses the degree of downward wage rigidity of on-
going employment relationships, i.e. we only consider “job stayers”. The dis-
tinction between job stayers and job switchers can bear important implications
for the measured degree of wage rigidity. Fehr and Goette (2005) found that
job switchers have more ﬂexible wages than job stayers. By not considering
job switchers, we remove wage changes resulting from job changes (which, in
turn, are likely to coincide with a change in productivity). To the extent that
ﬁrms use changes in staﬀ composition as another means of adjustment21,o u r
estimates provide an upper bound of wage rigidity.
In order to consider wage rigidity in isolation from changes in labour input,
our preferred measure of wage would be the hourly wage rate. However, as illus-
trated in Section 3.2.1, the measurement error in hours worked reported in the
dataset has profound implications for the shape of the hourly base wage change
distribution for salaried workers (cf. Figure 2(a) and Figure 3). For this reason
we disregard the information on hours worked for salaried workers and consider
the base salary as the variable of interest. Overall, the error that we might
commit by focusing on the base salary rather than on the hourly base wage in
case of salaried workers appears to be rather minor compared to the extent of
measurement error in the hours reported in the dataset.22 In case of hourly
workers our measure of wage is the implied hourly base wage. In what follows
we refer to this variable (consisting of the base salary for salaried workers and
the hourly base wage for hourly workers) simply as the “wage”.
Even though the database does include information about the occupational
status of the employee (blue-collar worker, white-collar worker, civil servant),
whether a given person is a salaried worker or an hourly worker remains unde-
ﬁned. As a general observation, white-collar workers and civil servants tend to
20According to Babecký et al. (2009), the share of bonuses in the total wage bill is roughly
3.5% in Spain but almost 50% in Portugal.
21Lünnemann and Mathä (2010) report that 28% of ﬁrms in Luxembourg considered oﬀering
a lower wage to new employees when they needed to reduce labour costs.
22For instance a change from full-time to part-time status of a salaried worker will appear
as a change in her salary. However, such changes will be likely removed as outliers.19
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be salaried while blue-collar workers are mostly remunerated on an hourly ba-
sis. Nevertheless, thorough inspection of the data suggests that this distinction
is too simplistic. Assuming that the true wage trajectory exhibits a step-wise
pattern, certain indications on the remuneration pattern (monthly basis ver-
sus hourly basis) can be derived from the dataset. Salaried employees earn an
agreed monthly base salary which typically is not aﬀected by ﬂuctuations in the
number of working days/hours per month (i.e. monthly salary is akin to a step
function). In the case of hourly workers, by contrast, the monthly salary would
reﬂect changes in the number of working days/hours while the hourly wage rate
typically does not (i.e. hourly wage is a step function).23 In this paper, a worker
is considered salaried if her monthly base salary exhibits smaller volatility (in
terms of the coeﬃcient of variation) than her hourly base wage. Otherwise, the
worker is considered an hourly worker.24
Even though the dataset has monthly frequency, our analysis of wage change
histograms (and measures of wage rigidity) focuses on January-to-January wage
changes because the y-o-y wage change is the key variable of interest within the
IWFP framework. In line with the IWFP procedure, we remove outliers as wage
changes below 35% and above 60%.
4 Methodology
4.1 Deﬁning downward wage rigidity
Microeconomic estimates of downward wage rigidity typically rely on the hy-
pothesis that the presence of wage rigidity will aﬀect the distribution of wage
changes. For instance, all else equal, downward wage rigidity will reduce the
observed number of wage cuts and augment the number of wage freezes (con-
stant wages in nominal or real terms). The extent of wage rigidity can then
be assessed from a comparison with an ideal (notional) distribution that would
prevail in a situation without wage rigidities. However, as illustrated in Section
3.2, our observed (empirical) distribution of wage changes will be distorted by
measurement error.
In a ﬁrst step, we consider three diﬀerent ways that transform the empirical
distribution of wage changes into an estimate of the true distribution without
measurement error. Section 4.2.1 describes the key assumptions of the IWFP
protocol. The IWFP protocol has been widely used to assess the degree of wage
rigidity on the basis of individual wage data. It has proven to be suﬃciently ﬂex-
ible to handle issues related to various types of measurement error arising with
diﬀerent types of datasets covering a vast range of countries. Complementary
23In case of staﬀ remunerated on the basis of a piece-rate, both the monthly salary and the
hourly wage can ﬂuctuate over time, reﬂecting changes in output. We do not consider this
case as we cannot identify whether a person is remunerated according to a piece-rate or not.
According to recent survey evidence, remuneration on the basis of a piece-rate is particularly
uncommon in Luxembourg (Lünnemann and Mathä (2010)).
24Alternatively, one could identify the relevant wage measure as the measure that is indexed
in the case of wage indexation. This approach has been followed in Lünnemann and Wintr
(2009).20
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to the IWFP procedure, in sections 4.2.2 and 4.2.3 we propose two procedures
to reduce measurement error. While the main objective of these two procedures
is to merely assess the robustness of the IWFP procedure with regard to the
identiﬁcation of measurement error, they are also considered a yardstick for as-
sessing the precision of the IWFP identiﬁcation scheme itself. Due to a lack of
higher frequency data on wages and earnings in many countries studied within
the framework of the IWFP, an important mainstay of the IWFP procedure is
to consider only year-on-year wage change observations. Given that our data
set discloses the full trajectory of the monthly salary earned by employee i af-
ﬁliated with ﬁrm j at monthly frequency, this additional of information could
potentially lead to a more complete assessment of downward wage rigidity.
4.2 Limiting measurement error
4.2.1 IWFP procedure
Similar to the method discussed in Section 4.2.2, the IWFP approach to limit
measurement error is based on the assumption that if errors are not correlated
from one period to another, then a wage increase due to measurement error will
likely be followed by a fall in the reported wage in the next period and vice
versa. In other words, measurement error will introduce negative autocorre-
lation in wage changes and this autocorrelation can be related directly to the
frequency and variance of errors. This assumption is in line with the ﬁnding for
the US reported in Abowd and Card (1989) and Gottschalk (2005).
The IWFP procedure considers wage changes from year to year and esti-
mates the fraction of observations in each cell of the discrete empirical wage
change histogram that can be expected to be found in the true distribution.
The observed wage changes are generated through the following model
wit = wit−1 + eit (1)
wo
it = wit + η 
it where η 
it =

0 if μit > 0 or τi > 0
ηit else. (2)
According to equation (1), the (log) true wage wit of an individual i at time t
follows a random walk which implies zero autocorrelation of wage changes (eit is
i.i.d. process). The (log) observed wage wo
it consists of the true wage and an error
η 
it. It is assumed that a fraction of the population p never reports errors, while
the remaining individuals report errors with probability c. This speciﬁcation is
particularly appealing in the case of our dataset because most wage trajectories
of white-collar workers and civil servants are reported correctly while many wage
trajectories of blue-collar workers appear to be aﬀected by measurement error
in hours worked. Formally, the random variable ηit is i.i.d. from a two-sided
Weibull distribution with zero mean; μit is an i.i.d. random variable with a
uniform distribution on the interval [−c,(1 − c)];a n dτi i sa s s u m e dt ob ea n21
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i.i.d. random variable with uniform distribution over the interval [p − 1,p].25
Following the IWFP approach, we estimated the proportion of the population
that is prone to make errors (1 − p) to be 38%. The probability that someone
who is likely to make a mistake makes one (c) is estimated at one.
4.2.2 AR treatment
As illustrated in Sections 3.2.1 and 3.2.2, the two main types of measurement er-
ror in the dataset tend to lead to more frequent mean reversion of wages. While
the true hourly wage rate is supposedly well-behaved and reveals the typical
upward-sloping, step-like pattern, the hourly wage rate implied by the informa-
tion from the dataset can be very volatile. Even in the absence of true cuts in
the (unreported) base wage, unreported overtime hours and/or reported norm
hours suggest a substantial number of downward wage changes. To the extent
that ﬁrms do not disclose overtime hours and/or report norm hours (rather than
the actual number of hours worked), changes in the hourly wage rate tend to
exhibit negative auto-correlation (for an illustration, see Figure 4).
In order to obtain an assessment of the true degree of downward wage rigid-
ity, for the purpose of cross-checking, we drop all wage trajectories from the
dataset for which wage changes reveal signiﬁcant negative auto-correlation.26
For each job spell l involving employee i and ﬁrm j, the presence of negative




l ∗ dwl,t−1 + c3
l ∗ (dwl,t−2 − dwl,t−1)+ l,t, (3)
where dwl,t denotes the log change in the wage observed for job spell l from
period t-1 to period t. In order to avoid the estimate of c2
l essentially being
driven by a few very large wage changes, we apply weighted regressions with












l ∗ (dwl,t−2 − dwl,t−1) ∗













25Technical details on the estimation of the true distribution using method of moments can
be found in Dickens and Goette (2006).
26Both the IWFP procedure and the AR treatment rely on the assumption that true wage
trajectories can typically be characterised by a step-like function. However, by considering
only y-o-y changes in wages/earnings at an annual frequency, the IWFP procedure implicitly
assumes the duration of “no wage change” (i.e. the depth of the step) to fall into a certain
interval. The AR treatment, by contrast, does not pre-suppose any speciﬁc duration of no
wage change.22
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Figure 4: Main types of measurement error and their implications for the mea-
sured degree of wage rigidity by period
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Main measurement error Mk 2
(unreported overtime hours)





























































































































Note: For illustrative purposes only. Plots with o markers (+ markers) refer to reported
data (unreported data) or numbers implied by reported data (unreported data), such as
the hourly wage. Red markers refer to hours worked, green markers to monthly salaries
and blue markers refer to the hourly wage.23
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where ˆ e represents the standardised residual, se
p
l,t is the standard error of
the prediction, ser
l,t is the standard error of the residual and kl refers to the
number of observations.
Contrary to the other two measures undertaken to limit measurement er-
ror, the AR treatment leads to observations being dropped from the dataset.
We expect the AR treatment to have a substantial impact on the size and the
structure of the dataset. This is in particular as we cannot exclude that unre-
ported overtime hours are a common source of measurement error in the case
of blue-collar workers. Overall, for almost one out of two job spells we ﬁnd
signiﬁcant auto-correlation at the 5% signiﬁcance level. Removing these job
spells from the dataset also aﬀects the structure of the dataset with regard to
the occupational groups and sectors. While the share of observations referring
to blue-collar workers shrinks to less than 14% (down from almost 22% in the
cleaned dataset), the fraction of observations referring to white-collar workers
rises to 70% (up from 61% in the cleaned dataset). The proportion of obser-
vations referring to civil servants remains almost unchanged (between 16% and
17% in both datasets). In terms of sectors, the AR treatment leads to smaller
proportions of observations referring to Public administration and defence; com-
pulsory social security (−2 percentage points) and Health and social work (−4
percentage points). By contrast, the AR treatment leads to a higher proportion
of observations referring to Real estate, renting and business activities (+5 per-
centage points) and Wholesale and retail trade (+2 percentage points).27
4.2.3 Break-point test
As a second cross-check of the shape of the true distribution of wage changes, we
follow Gottschalk (2005) and assume that the measurement error-free base wage
trajectory is a step function and that true base wage changes can be identiﬁed
as structural breaks in the wage series. Wage changes that do not coincide with
structural breaks are considered reﬂecting measurement error.
More speciﬁcally, we apply the multiple break point test proposed by Bai
and Perron (1998) which provides a least squares estimator of the number of
break points, their timing, as well as the corresponding wage levels based on
a recursive algorithm. In simple terms, the procedure identiﬁes the ﬁrst struc-
tural break as the one leading to the lowest sum of squared residuals over the
two corresponding subsamples. Next, the null hypothesis of no break is tested
against the alternative of a single break. If one break is identiﬁed, the sample
is split at that break point and the test is applied again to divide the samples.
In this second round, the null hypothesis of one break is tested against the al-
ternative of two breaks. In practice the regression model is the same at each
stage but the critical values for identifying additional breaks become stricter
with each successive test. More details on the procedure and its application to
27For one out of two sectors, the deviations are smaller than 1 percentage point.24
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Luxembourg micro wage data can be found in Lünnemann and Wintr (2009).
The test will identify breakpoints in the wage series whenever the change in
the mean wage between two subsequent segments is suﬃciently large relative to
the variation of the wage around the mean within the segment. The rejection
of the null hypothesis of no structural change suggests a genuine wage change.
By contrast, wage changes that do not create suﬃciently large variation are
considered reﬂecting measurement error. Bai and Perron (1998) show that the
asymptotic properties of their multiple break point test hold for a very general
form of measurement error and that the test can be used when the data are
trending.
The maximum number of structural breaks that the Bai-Perron test can
identify is determined by the trajectory length and the critical values tabulated
by Bai and Perron (1998). This implies a maximum of nine breaks for a wage
trajectory consisting of 73 observations. This upper bound might be too restric-
tive given there were already six events of wage indexation during the sample
period. For this reason, before running the breakpoint test, we removed from
the dataset the eﬀects of institutional wage changes 28 by deducting the respec-
tive wage increases as stipulated by regulation for the periods and individuals
concerned. At the same time, we removed outliers from the monthly dataset de-
ﬁned as wage changes below 35% and above 50%.29 Once the structural breaks
are identiﬁed, we add the institutional wage changes removed in ﬁrst place. This
provides an upper bound on the true number of wage changes as some of the
wage changes due to wage indexation or change in statutory minimum wage
might not have been identiﬁed as structural breaks if the procedure allowed for
higher maximum number of structural breaks.30
4.3 Estimating wage rigidity
Our estimates of downward wage rigidity are based on the IWFP methodology
using the true distribution of wage changes described in Section 4.2.1. The
IWFP protocol distinguishes two sets of estimates, i.e. “simple measures” (dis-
cussed in Section 4.3.1) and “model-based estimates” (see Section 4.3.2).31
4.3.1 Simple measures
The simple measure of DNWR is based on the assumption that everyone who
had a nominal wage freeze (i.e. unchanged nominal wage from the previous
28Hereafter, institutional wage changes are deﬁned as wage changes due to automatic wage
indexation or changes in the statutory minimum wage.
29The treshholds are identical to those applied in the IWFP procedure. Contrary to the
IWFP procedure, however, here they refer to month-on-month wage changes.
30In spite of the pre-adjustment of the wage spells, the number of breaks identiﬁed might still
be constrained by the maximum number of break dates allowed which, in turn, is restricted by
the length of the job spell and the critical values reported in Bai and Perron (1998). Overall,
the maximum number of breaks is hit for 16% of job spells. We cannot exclude that for a
fraction of these spells the true number of wage changes is higher.
31Hereafter, DNWR (DRWR) is used as an abbreviation of downward nominal wage rigidity
(downward real wage rigidity).25
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period) would have had a nominal wage cut in the absence of DNWR, regard-
less of the reason for the wage cut.32 Based on the true distribution, we divide
the fraction of workers with nominal wage freezes33 (fn) by the fraction of
workers with either nominal wage cuts (cn) or nominal freezes. The aim is to
avoid direct measures such as the fraction of workers with nominal wage freezes
because they are likely to vary over time, in line with the expected inﬂation rate.
The simple measure of DRWR is based on a similar idea, i.e. it is deﬁned
as a fraction of workers with real wage freezes (fr) over the sum of workers
with either real freezes or real wage cuts (cr). The situation is complicated by
the fact that ﬁrms and individuals might have diﬀerent inﬂation expectations,
which implies that the spike in the wage change distribution due to DRWR will
have a spread. Details on the derivation of the simple measure of DRWR in this
situation can be found in Dickens et al. (2008).
4.3.2 Model based measures
Dickens et al. (2007) propose alternative estimates of DNWR and DRWR based
on a model of wage changes (again applied to the true wage change distribu-
tion). It is assumed that in case there were no rigidities, the distribution of
log wage changes (i.e. the notional distribution) follows a symmetric two-sided
Weibull distribution.34 Hence, the notional wage change dn
it of worker i at time
t is a draw from the notional distribution in the respective period t. A fraction
of the workers nt is potentially subject to DNWR. If such a worker receives a
negative notional wage change, and he/she is not subject to DRWR, he/she will
receive a wage freeze instead of a wage cut. Another proportion of the workers
ρt is assumed to be potentially subject to DRWR. If their notional wage change
falls below their expected rate of inﬂation, they will receive a wage change equal
to expected inﬂation instead of the notional wage change. Formally, we deﬁne














t ),  r
it is an i.i.d. random variable from U(0,1) and ρt is
the probability that an individual is subject to DRWR. The true wage change
dt
i is then determined by
32The resistance of workers to wage cuts can be a result of implicit or explicit agreements,
labour norms etc.
33We consider tiny wage changes in the order of euro cent as exact wage freezes. To be
precise, as suggested by the IWFP protocol, the zero log-wage change bin has a width of
0.034%.
34This choice is based on the observation that the distribution of wage changes is typically
more peaked and has fatter tails than the normal distribution. The upper half of the dis-
tribution seems to be well proxied by a Weibull distribution. In addition, they show that
in countries not aﬀected by wage rigidities, the lower tail seems to be a mirror image of the
upper one. Dickens et al. (2008) provide an example of a wage formation process (similar to
the tournament model of Rosen (1986)) that leads to a wage change distribution that can be
approximated by a Weibull distribution.26
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it is an i.i.d. random variable from U(0,1) and nt is the probability
that an individual is subject to DNWR. The model is estimated with method
of moments, details can be again found in Dickens and Goette (2006).
5 Results
Given the role of measurement error in assessing the true degree of wage rigid-
ity, Section 5.1 focuses on the analysis of the true distribution of wage change
implied by the three diﬀerent techniques described in Section 4.2.35 Estimates
of downward nominal and real wage rigidity for the entire economy, by occupa-
tional groups and by sectors are provided in Sections 5.2, 5.3 and 5.4, respec-
tively. Section 5.5 assesses simple estimates of downward wage rigidity at the
ﬁrm level.
5.1 Estimates of the true wage change distribution
Similar to other studies analysing the degree of downward wage rigidity based on
micro wage data, we ﬁnd that measurement error indeed leads to a substantial
bias. By replacing (i.e. break-point test), disregarding (i.e. AR treatment) or
correcting for erroneous observations, all three measures to reduce measurement
error lead to a substantial adjustment in the distribution of wage changes (see
Figure 5) with important implications for the overall variation, the (a)symmetry
of the distribution, and the concentration of wage changes around certain mass
points. Figure 5 and Table 1 allow us the following observations on certain
aspects of the wage change distributions that might reﬂect the presence (or lack
of) downward wage rigidity.
First, based on their multi-country study, Dickens et al. (2008) highlight
the presence of a large spike at zero (i.e. no wage change) in the wage change
histogram in countries with substantial DNWR (e.g. the spike accounts for
more than 15% of wage change observations in the US in 1987). In the case
of Luxembourg, by contrast, there is no apparent spike at zero in any of the
wage change distributions. The low proportion of wage changes in the zero bin
suggests a relatively low fraction of workers with nominal wage freezes. This
applies to both the initial dataset, for which we observe a mere 0.3% of wage
changes in the zero bin, as well as after limiting for measurement error when
the share of wage changes falling into the zero bin ranges from 0.2% (according
to the breakpoint test) to 0.5% (according to the AR treatment).
35In order to allow for a direct comparison with international evidence from the IWFP, the
bins shown in the histograms below are deﬁned according to the IWFP procedure, see also
the note under Figure 5.27
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Note: January-to-January log wage changes were aggregated over the sample period. The
broken lines delimit the zero bin with width of 0.034% and centered at zero. Bins have a
width of 1 percent except for those neighbouring the zero bin. Outliers below -35% and
above 60% were removed. For the deﬁnition of wage, see Section 3.3.
Second, the wage change distributions appear to be asymmetric with fewer
observations below the zero bin than in the symmetric upper tail of the distri-
bution. For example, in the empirical distribution, the share of nominal wage
cuts in total wage changes is approximately 7.7% only while the corresponding
symmetric upper tail of the distribution of y-o-y wage changes (i.e. between
twice the median and 35% plus twice the median) covers nearly 18% of obser-
vations. Under the assumption that the distribution of wage changes would be
symmetric in a situation without wage rigidity, one would infer that the rela-
tively few nominal wage cuts are a manifestation of downward wage rigidity. It
is also notable that the methods to limit measurement error suggest that more
than half of the nominal wage cuts reported in the original datset are due to
measurement error with the IWFP procedure signaling that only 25% of the
nominal wage cuts reported are genuine wage cuts. The impact of measurement
error is highly asymmetric because in the range of wage changes between 5% and
40% measurement error accounts only for 7.5% of the observed wage changes
according to the IWFP procedure.
Third, the asymmetry of the wage change distribution goes beyond the zero
bin and extends to the 2–3% bin. In the empirical distribution, roughly one
in ten wage changes is smaller than 2%. After limiting measurement error, the
fraction of wage changes below 2% varies from 2.3% (IWFP) to 5.4% (AR treat-
ment) and we obtain a quasi-left-truncated distribution. This suggests that a28
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Table 1: Selected statistics of the wage change distribution
Percentage of log-wage changes
below 0-bin below 2% in 0-bin in 2–3% bin
Empirical 7.65 11.00 0.31 24.7
AR true 3.56 5.39 0.46 36.1
BP true 2.53 3.29 0.18 48.4
IWFP true 1.98 2.30 0.32 30.2
Notes: The zero bin ranges from -0.017% to 0.017%. Outliers excluded.
strategy to circumvent wage indexation by combining the obligatory wage in-
crease with a nominal wage cut is not common. The result might be linked to
the presence of DRWR.
Fourth, the most common interval for wage changes is from 2% to 3%. This
result, which applies to all years under study and both before and after limit-
ing measurement error, is not surprising as the automatic wage indexation falls
into this interval and during the sample period there was one wage indexation
in each calendar year. All the approaches limiting measurement error suggest
an even stronger concentration of wage changes than in the original dataset.
The break point test indicates that nearly half of all wage changes (48%) fall
into this interval. The 2–3% bin still being relatively wide, Figure 6 further
splits this interval and shows that, on average, more than 80% (more than 90%)
of all wage changes in the 2–3% bin refer to the narrow interval from 2.45%
to 2.50% according to the AR treatment (multiple break point test), i.e. very
close to the rate of wage increase stipulated by the automatic wage indexation
mechanism.36 Given that the annual inﬂation rate based on the national in-
dex of consumer prices ranged from 2% (2002) to 2.7% (2005) over the sample
period, the evidence of a large spike in the wage change histogram around the
expected inﬂation rate and lack of mass below might suggest the case of DRWR.
Fifth, the results are fairly robust not only with regard to the approach
used to delimit measurement error, but also over time (see Figure 11 in the
Appendix). One striking diﬀerence among the histograms is the presence of the
second spike in some of the years. Close scrutiny of both wage level and wage
change data at the micro level reveals that the second spike can be due to two
factors. First, wage changes of public sector employees are particularly concen-
trated in two or three wage change intervals. For instance, between January
2001 and January 2002, more than 60% of wage changes of civil servants fell
into the interval 4-6%. This appears to be the sole reason for the second spike
in the wage change histogram in panel (a) in Figure 11. The histogram of price
changes of private sector employees in the same period reveals only one spike in
the 2-3% interval. The same argument applies for the period between January
2003 and January 2004 (panel (c) in Figure 11).
36The 2.5% wage increase stipulated by the automatic wage indexation mechanism trans-
lates into an approximately 0.0247 log change.29
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Figure 6: Distribution of wage change in the 2% to 3% interval













































Note: January-to-January log wage changes aggregated over the sample period.
Another reason for the additional spike in the wage change distribution is
the bi-annual increase in the statutory minimum wage. Over the sample period,
changes to the statutory minimum wage had been implemented in January 2001,
January 2003, January 2005 and January 2007 (see Section 2.2). As the adjust-
ments to the statutory minimum wage varied over the sample period, contrary
to the case of automatic wage indexation, their impact does not necessarily
show up at a unique bin of the histogram. As indicated in Section 2.2, dur-
ing the sample period, the bi-annual increase in the statutory minimum wage
was between 1.9% (January 2007) and 3.5% (January 2003). Together with the
one automatic wage indexation per calendar year over the sample period, this
can explain a spike in the 4 − 5% bin (5 − 6%) in 2007 (2003), see Figure 11.
Moreover, the impact of adjustments to the statutory minimum wage on the
distribution of wage changes is not limited to a single bin either. Rather, work-
ers may be subject to wage increases which are smaller than the full increase in
the minimum wage if their salary/wage is between the old minimum wage level
and the new minimum wage level.37
5.2 Estimates of downward wage rigidity
In this section, we discuss the estimates of downward wage rigidity for Luxem-
bourg and place them in an international perspective. The true distributions of
wage changes that were estimated in the previous section point to a very low
fraction of negative wage changes or wage changes below 2 percent. At the same
time, none of the true distributions exhibits a noticeable spike at zero, implying
that DNWR should not be a major issue in Luxembourg. The simple measure
of DNWR based on the IWFP true distribution directly related to the fraction
of workers with nominal wage freezes leads to an average estimate of DNWR
37The impact described so far is the direct impact of the minimum wage regulation. In
practice, an indirect impact on the distribution of wage changes could arise if minimum wage
adjustments were to result in a shift in the entire pay scale, an assessment which is clearly
beyond the scope of this paper.30
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Table 2: Estimates of downward real and nominal wage rigidity
White-collar workers
Blue-collar workers* and civil servants* All
DNWR DRWR DNWR DRWR DNWR DRWR
Simple (true) 0.204 1.067 0.117 1.167 0.138 1.129
(0.109) (0.085) (0.049) (0.036) (0.059) (0.035)
Model-based N/A 0.998 N/A 0.961 N/A 0.998
(0.295) (0.061) (0.078)
Notes: Averages include only results with estimated conﬁdence bands that do not span the entire
[0;1] interval. Hence, the average of model-based measures is based on 2 years in case of white-collar
workers and civil servants and 3 years in each of the remaining two categories. The average of simple
measures spans all 6 years in each category. Estimates of the simple measures are based on the
IWFP true wage change distribution. Simple average of standard errors in parentheses.
* Lower bound on Weibull parameter a raised to 0.015 (from default 0.01).
of 0.14 (Table 2). On the other hand, all of the true wage distributions appear
to be quasi-left-truncated at the wage change bin of 2 to 3 percent. This might
suggest a substantial degree of DRWR in case the wage bargaining focal point
of a substantial proportion of workers falls into this range. This is conﬁrmed in
Table 2 showing that the simple estimate of DRWR based on the IWFP true
distribution is on average 1.13.38 In international comparison, the estimates ob-
tained for Luxembourg lie at the extremes. According to Dickens et al. (2008)
the simple measure of DNWR is lower only in Ireland and is at a compara-
ble level in Denmark, France and Belgium. In contrast, the simple estimates of
DRWR are lower than 0.7 in all the 16 countries studied in Dickens et al. (2008).
The model-based estimates of wage rigidity conﬁrm the conclusion obtained
from the simple measures. The average model-based estimate of DRWR pre-
sented in Table 2 is 0.998, which is only marginally below the upper bound of
one and substantially higher than the ﬁgures provided in Dickens et al. (2007),
see Figure 7.39 Again, the ﬁnding of very strong downward real wage rigidity in
Luxembourg is robust over time, with ρ being in the interval (0.996, 0.999) in
all of the years studied. This suggests that nearly every worker in Luxembourg
is potentially subject to DRWR. As a mirror image of the strong DRWR, we
did not obtain sensible estimates of nominal rigidity in any of the years.40 Fig-
ure 7 provides the model-based estimates of downward nominal and real wage
rigidity reported by Dickens et al. (2007) and includes the corresponding values
that we obtained for Luxembourg. Dickens et al. (2007) report model-based
estimates of DRWR well below 0.6 for all 16 countries considered. The three
highest measures of downward real wage rigidity are found for France, Finland
and Sweden (all roughly 0.5). As in the case of simple measures, the extent of
38Note that according to equation (??), the estimate of r is eﬀectively bound to lie between
zero and two while the model based estimates are delimited by zero and one.
39The yearly estimates of DRWR hit the upper bound of one in three years which did not
allow us to obtain an estimate of its standard error and hence we excluded those years from
the average.
40The estimate of DNWR hit the boundary in all years except for one year. However,
the standard error in that year exceeded 200 and so the observation was discarded from the
average presented in Table 2.31
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Source: Dickens et al. (2007), Du Caju et al. (2007) and our calculations.
DRWR in Luxembourg is exceptionally high in international comparison and
cannot be simply ascribed to diﬀerences in methodology or data.41
To our best knowledge, there is only one set of alternative estimates of down-
ward nominal and real wage rigidity for Luxembourg provided by Holden and
Wulfsberg (2007a) and Holden and Wulfsberg (2007b), respectively. Both pa-
pers use industry level data on the percentage growth of gross hourly earnings
for manual workers in manufacturing, mining, energy and construction cover-
ing 19 OECD countries over the period 1973-1999. Both papers estimate the
notional wage change distribution by pooling country-year samples with high
nominal and real wage growth assuming that those distributions will not be
signiﬁcantly aﬀected by wage rigidity. Consistent with our results, Holden and
Wulfsberg (2007b) conclude that Luxembourg has the highest degree of real
wage rigidity within the set of countries studied, even though their estimate
(0.13) is much lower than ours. On the other hand, downward nominal wage
rigidity in Luxembourg according to Holden and Wulfsberg (2007a) is signiﬁ-
cantly diﬀerent from zero and there are eight countries with lower DNWR than
41Even though we showed in Section 5.1 that the IWFP error correction technique leads to
very similar results when compared to two alternative approaches in Luxembourg, we cannot
generalize our conclusion to the case of other countries or datasets which might suﬀer from a
diﬀerent type or extent of measurement error.32
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their estimate for Luxembourg (0.27).42
In Section 5, the estimates for the full economy suggested the quasi-absence
of wage cuts (whether nominal or real) in Luxembourg over the entire sample
period. While there is strong evidence of a high degree of downward real wage
rigidity at the level of the entire economy, the overall result might nevertheless
hide signiﬁcant diﬀerences across occupational groups, sectors and/or ﬁrms.
First, diﬀerences with regard to the degree of downward real rigidity across oc-
cupational groups and sectors might result from diﬀerent institutional settings
governing the wage setting process other than automatic wage indexation and
the statutory minimum wage. Second, similar to other empirical work on rigidi-
ties (whether wages or prices) the low frequency of wage cuts observed might not
only signal strong downward wage rigidity, but also result from weak incentives
for ﬁrms to actually reduce labour costs in the absence of negative shocks. On
average, the 6-year sample period is characterised by moderate to strong eco-
nomic growth (average annual growth in GDP between 2001 and 2007: 4.6%)
and moderate to high inﬂation rates (average annual inﬂation rate between 2001
and 2007: 2.3%).43 At the same time, the Luxembourg economy witnessed a
strong increase in employment (average annual growth in the number of jobs:
3.5%) and in the total wage bill (average annual growth rate in base wages and
bonuses combined: 6.4%). However, even in the absence of sizeable negative
shocks at the aggregate level, ﬁrm-speciﬁc shocks can vary substantially. To the
extent that ﬁrms face diﬀerent ﬁrm-speciﬁc shocks, including negative shocks
for a subset of ﬁrms, the absence of signiﬁcant diﬀerences with regard to the
ﬁrm-speciﬁc degree of wage rigidity might then suggest a genuinely high degree
of wage rigidity.44
5.3 Estimates of downward wage rigidity by occupational
group
The literature on wage rigidity provides several reasons why the extent of down-
ward wage rigidity might diﬀer across occupational groups. The eﬃciency wage
theories (e.g. Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984)) and adverse selection models (Weiss
(1980)) predict that ﬁrms will be more reluctant to cut wages of employees
whose eﬀort is more diﬃcult to monitor or those with high hiring and training
costs in order to avoid that these workers reduce their eﬀort or leave the ﬁrm. In
both cases, cutting wages of white-collar workers can be potentially more costly
for the ﬁrm. Campbell (1997) reported that wages of skilled and white-collar
workers in the US are less-responsive to changes in unemployment but at the
42The diﬀerences to our results with regard to the level of downward wage rigidity in Lux-
embourg could be ascribed to several factors. First, our estimates are based on individual
data and avoid potential aggregation and compositional eﬀects. In addition, our dataset has
economy-wide coverage. Several studies found that blue-collar workers are subject to lower de-
gree of wage rigidity (e.g. Campbell (1997)). Similarly, Du Caju et al. (2009) ﬁnd substantial
diﬀerences in wage rigidity across sectors in Belgium.
43While the growth dynamics changed quite substantially, the annual growth rate of aggre-
gate GDP never fell below 1.5% during the 6-year sample period. Annual GDP growth was
highest in 2007 (6.4%), 2006 (5.6%) and 2005 (5.4%).
44By contrast, if our estimates of wage rigidity were driven by the absence of negative
shocks we would expect the ﬁrm-speciﬁc estimates of wage rigidity to vary according to ﬁrm
characteristics.33
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same time adjust more rapidly to inﬂation. Using the IWFP methodology, Du
Caju et al. (2007) found that the degree of both downward nominal and real
wage rigidity is higher for white-collar workers in Belgium. The diﬀerence is at
least 25% in the case of the model-based measures. Babecký et al. (2009) using
survey data for 15 EU countries report that ﬁrms employing a larger proportion
of high-skilled white-collar workers are more likely to be subject to both down-
ward nominal and real wage rigidity.
Table 2 above reports estimates of downward rigidity for the two largest oc-
cupational groups, i.e. blue-collar workers and white-collar workers. Our results,
however, do not suggest signiﬁcantly diﬀerent degrees of DRWR.For blue-collar
workers we obtain, on average, a ρ of 0.998. The average ρ for white-collar
workers and civil servants is 0.961.45
However, the diﬀerence between the two categories does not seem to be
signiﬁcant given the relatively large standard errors obtained for blue-collar
workers. The homogeneity of the estimates of wage rigidity is conﬁrmed by the
simple measures and holds both for nominal and real wage rigidity.46 These
results are in line with the evidence presented in Lünnemann and Wintr (2009)
showing substantial diﬀerences in the frequency of wage change among occupa-
tional groups in Luxembourg but only minor diﬀerences in the frequency of wage
cuts. Altogether, the results suggest that the eﬀect of labour market institu-
tions, especially wage indexation, is particularly strong in Luxembourg, thereby
overriding any potential underlying diﬀerences in wage rigidity that might be
related to worker characteristics.
5.4 Estimates of downward wage rigidity by sector
The extent of wage rigidity can also diﬀer across sectors of economic activity.
Campbell (1989) and Campbell (1991) show that the estimates of wage ﬂexibil-
ity for the US, Canada and France based on the responsiveness of sector-level
wages to the aggregate unemployment and sectoral product demand can be
related to the proportions of blue-collar and white-collar workers and capital
intensity in the respective sector. Du Caju et al. (2009) document that sectoral
diﬀerences in wage rigidity in Belgium persist even after controlling for compo-
sitional eﬀects. More rigid wages were found in sectors with centralised wage
bargaining and in more competitive and labour intensive sectors.
Our estimates of DRWR for the major sectors in Luxembourg are presented
in Table 3 below.47 It is true that more than in the case of occupational groups
the estimates of downward wage rigidity vary across sectors and results tend
to be more sensitive to the method used to limit measurement error. However,
45We also derived results for white-collar workers and civil servants separately. Certain
aspects of the distribution of wage changes for civil servants, however, suggest that the esti-
mates of ρ for civil servants are misleading. For further discussion of this issue, please refer
to Section 5.4 below.
46Reﬂecting the very high degree of downward real wage rigidity, the IWFP protocol does
not provide any model-based estimates of downward nominal wage rigidity though.
47Owing to their small size, we do not consider the sectors Agriculture and Energy.34
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Table 3: Estimates of downward real wage rigidity across sectors
Pct (Δ log-wage < 2%) Simple true Model-based
Sector AR BP DRWR DRWR St. error
Industry 5.08 3.86 1.216 0.970 (.109)
Construction 5.61 3.74 0.718 0.994 (.072)
Trade* 6.18 4.03 0.931 0.986 (.12)
Market services 5.15 3.39 1.135 0.994 (.09)
Financial services 6.90 4.19 1.034 0.871 (.043)
Other services 4.37 2.30 1.275 0.618 (.045)
Notes: Averages include only results with estimated conﬁdence bands that do not span the entire
[0;1] interval. The average of model-based measures is based on at least 4 years in each sector.
Estimates of the simple measure are based on the IWFP true wage change distribution and span
all 6 years in each sector. Simple average of standard errors in parentheses.
* Lower bound on Weibull parameter a raised to 0.015 (from default 0.01).
these diﬀerences must be considered against the overall very low fraction of wage
cuts. The fraction of wage changes below 2% is relatively small in all sectors
according to both the AR treatment and the breakpoint test.
The model-based estimates of DRWR are very close to one in all sectors con-
sidered with the exception of Financial services and Other services (comprising
Public administration and defence; compulsory social security, Education and
Other community, social and personal service activities). For Financial services
the lower degree of real wage rigidity according to the IWFP model-based mea-
sure might reﬂect the highest fraction of wage changes below 2%, see Table 3.
This is in clear contrast to Other services, for which the lowest estimate of
ρ is obtained in spite of the lowest fraction of real wage cuts among the sectors
considered.48 However, the lower estimate of ρ for a sector populated predomi-
nantly by civil servants does not reﬂect a lower degree of real wage rigidity but
rather results from the speciﬁcities of both the IWFP protocol and the distri-
bution of annual wage changes for public sector employment. As illustrated in
Figure 12 in the Appendix, the distribution of annual wage changes for the Other
services sector diﬀers from those typically obtained for the entire economy in
that the mode of the distribution is not around the 2.5% stipulated by automatic
wage indexation, but rather in the 4–5% or 5–6% bin. In the model-based esti-
mate, this translates into higher estimate of the “wage bargaining focal point”
(i.e. intended to capture wage increases due to expected inﬂation, productivity
growth, collective bargaining etc.) close to this modal bin. As discussed in
Section 4, the absense of wage changes below the “wage bargaining focal point”
indicates DRWR. However, in Figure 12 all the observations in the 2–3% bin
fall below the “wage bargaining focal point” and hence lower the model-based
estimate of DRWR. Note that the simple measure of DRWR is not aﬀected be-
casue in that case the “wage bargaining focal point” is simply approximated by
(backward-looking) expected inﬂation. For civil servants and sectors with pre-
dominantly public sector employment, thus, the mere (very low) fraction of real
48In analogy, we obtained a lower estimate of ρ for civil servants compared to white-collar
workers and blue-collar workers (see Section 5.3).35
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wage cuts might be a more reliable proxy of DRWR than the IWFP model-based
estimate. In sum, both the simple and model-based measures tend to conﬁrm
a high degree of downward real wage rigidity in large parts of the economy (in
particular, when compared to the international IWFP evidence).
5.5 Downward wage rigidity at the ﬁrm level
As already suggested, the low frequency of wage cuts (both in real and in nom-
inal terms) might be a result of the overall moderate to strong growth dynam-
ics observed over the sample period with relatively little need for ﬁrms to cut
wages (rather than genuine downward wage rigidity). If indeed, our aggregate
estimates of substantial downward wage rigidity were essentially driven by the
lack of negative shocks at the aggregate level, we would expect weaker signs of
downward wage rigidity in those parts of the economy being subject to sluggish
(or negative) growth.
This section provides estimates of downward wage rigidity at the ﬁrm level.
As the impact of negative shocks on public institutions is unclear, it refers to
non-agricultural and non-energy private ﬁrms only.49 Moreover to ensure a min-
imum number of observations of annual changes in the wagebill and staﬀ, we
focus on ﬁrms with a minimum duration of 37 months (in-sample).
Since we have no information about the output at the ﬁrm level, hereafter,
growth rates in employment and total wage bill are considered (admittedly poor)
proxies for company performance. The dataset suggests strong heterogeneity in
growth dynamics among Luxembourg non-agricultural and non-energy private
ﬁrms over the sample period. Figure 8 illustrates the distribution of the ﬁrm-
speciﬁc average annual growth rate of the total wage bill and the headcount,
respectively. Among the roughly 22 800 private non-agricultural and non-energy
private ﬁrms that prevailed in the dataset for at least 37 months, the average
growth rate in the nominal wage bill (headcount) was 5.9% (2.1%). Almost
5 000 ﬁrms (i.e. 22% of the ﬁrms) reveal a negative average annual growth rate
in the total wage bill while for almost 7 900 ﬁrms (i.e. 35% of the ﬁrms) the
average annual growth rate is below 2.5% (see Figure 8(a)).50 Almost 4 000
ﬁrms (i.e. 17% of the ﬁrms considered), on average, reveal a reduction in their
headcount (see Figure 8(b)).
Figure 9 illustrates that the fraction of wage cuts (whether nominal or real)
varies among companies. According to the breakpoint test procedure, for ap-
proximately 90% of the non-agricultural and non-energy private ﬁrms that were
active for at least 37 months (in-sample), the fraction of nominal wage cuts in
all wage changes was 10% or lower (see Figure 9(a)). For 85% of the persistent
49While the dataset does not provide explicit information on the ownership of the company,
we consider a company public if and only if the dataset reports at least one civil servant
among the staﬀ. We cannot exclude, however, this being a too narrow deﬁnition of public
institutions.
50These ﬁgures refer to the total wage bill, i.e. they include bonuses and one-oﬀ payments.
The corresponding shares for annual growth rates in base wages are 22% and 34%, respectively.36
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Figure 8: Average annual growth in the total wage bill and headcount
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Note: Distribution over all non-agricultural and non-energy private ﬁrms with a minimum
duration of 37 months (averaged across years). While the dispersed distribution of changes
in the total wage bill across ﬁrms, at ﬁrst glance, appears diﬃcult to reconcile with the
high degree of wage rigidity reported before, it is important to note that (i) Figure 8(a)
illustrates the distribution of the annual change in the total wage bill (i.e. including
bonuses, overtime hour compensation, etc.) while our analysis of the degree of downward
wage rigidity focuses on the base wage after applying measures to limit for measurement
error; (ii) The distribution of the annual change in headcounts across ﬁrms must be
considered against the (mode) size of ﬁrms in the Luxembourg economy. Almost nine
out of ten ﬁrms with a constant number of staﬀ (see the spike in Figure 8(b)) employs
no more than two staﬀ members. For such small companies, variations in the total wage
bill will typically result from a change in the remuneration (rather than from a change
in their headcount); (iii) While the analysis of DRWR focuses on changes in the wage
of a given employee, the annual change in the total wage bill reported in Figure 8(a) is
obtained by aggregating all wage components across all staﬀ members. To the extent that
individual wages are not perfectly synchronised, frequent changes in the total wage bill
may hide very infrequent wage adjustments at the level of the individual staﬀ member;
(iv) Changes in the ﬁrm’s wage bill might reﬂect changes in the number of ordinary work
hours when staﬀ members are remunerated at an (identical) hourly wage rate.
ﬁrms the share of real wage cuts (i.e. wage changes below 2.5%) in all wage
changes was no more than 10% (see Figure 9(b)). According to the AR treat-
ment, the corresponding fractions are more than 85% and close to 80% (Figures
9(c) and 9(d), respectively). According to the breakpoint test, the average share
of nominal wage cuts in all wage changes across ﬁrms is 2.9% and the ﬁrm av-
erage share of wage changes lower than the rate stipulated by automatic wage
indexation is 4.9%. According to the AR treatment, the ﬁrm average shares are
3.8% and 6.9%, respectively.
How can one characterise the (relatively few) non-agricultural and non-
energy private ﬁrms revealing a higher than average frequency of wage cuts?
Figure 13 in the Appendix reports no obvious relationship between the fraction
of wage cuts and the growth rate of the total wage bill (left hand side panels)
or of headcount (right hand side panels) at the ﬁrm level. Both the breakpoint
test and the AR treatment suggest that on average the fraction of wage cuts
is higher for ﬁrms suﬀering from negative growth in headcount and total wage
bill.51 Nevertheless, wage cuts can be found for both growing ﬁrms and shrink-
ing ﬁrms. In addition, simple least squares estimates provide no robust evidence
suggesting a signiﬁcant impact of ﬁrm growth (as proxied by the growth rate in
51According to the breakpoint test, the average fraction of wage cuts at the ﬁrm level is 2.9%
but rises to 3.3% (3.8%) for ﬁrms with shrinking headcount (wage bill). This is conﬁrmed
by the AR treatment, where the corresponding proportions of wage cuts are 3.7%, 3.9% and
4.6%, respectively.37
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Figure 9: Fraction of wage cuts in ﬁrms’ wage changes; Distribution over ﬁrms
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Note: Horizontal axis depicts the percentage of wage cuts (nominal or real) and the bars
indicate the fraction of non-agricultural and non-energy private ﬁrms with the average
share of wage cuts falling into each interval. Distribution over ﬁrms (averaged across
years).
total wage bill and headcount) on the fraction of wage cuts once accounting for
ﬁrm size and sector of activity. This applies to both nominal and real wage cuts.
In sum, in spite of (minor) diﬀerences with regard to the estimated degree
of downward wage rigidity across ﬁrms, our results consistently suggest a high
degree of downward wage rigidity by international standards for the vast ma-
jority of ﬁrms in all sectors of the Luxembourg economy. Given the strong
heterogeneity in the growth pattern across ﬁrms over the sample period, we
therefore consider our results not to be markedly driven by the absence of neg-
ative shocks. In a competitive, proﬁt-oriented environment ﬁrms face pressure
to cut costs at all times, not only when hit by an explicit negative shock. While
negative shocks might strengthen the incentive to implement wage cuts, they
do not overcome the overall downward wage rigidity in the economy.52
52If large number of ﬁrms was hit by a negative shock at the same time, it is more likely
that they could overcome downward wage rigidity by some coordination mechanism.38
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(b) Average distributions of wage changes, 05/2002 − 05/2006
Note: May-to-May log wage changes. The broken lines delimit the zero bin with width of
0.034% and centered at zero. Bins have a width of 1 percent except for those neighbouring
the zero bin. Outliers below -35% and above 60% were removed. For the deﬁnition of
wage, see Section 3.3.
5.6 The role of wage indexation
Since we found only minor diﬀerences in DRWR across sectors, occupational
groups and ﬁrms despite very diﬀerent dynamics at the sector and the ﬁrm
level, we conclude that the main driving factor of the high degree of DRWR
in Luxembourg covers basically the entire economy. To evaluate the potential
role of the automatic wage indexation mechanism as the main source of DRWR
in Luxembourg, we analyzed the distribution of wage changes in periods of 12
consecutive months during which wage indexation did not occur.53
Figure 10(a) shows the histogram of wage changes in one of these periods,
May 2001 to May 2002, and compares it to the average of May to May wage
53These include 05/2001–05/2002, 07/2002–07/2003, 09/2003–09/2004 and 11/2005–
11/2006.39
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change distributions between 05/2002 and 05/2006 (panel (b) in Figure 10).
About 30–40% of wages did not change between May 2001 and May 2002 (re-
sults adjusted for measurement error) and nominal wage cuts appear rare. The
wage change distribution for the remaining periods resembles the one which we
obtained for January to January wage changes (cf. Figure 5) with a marked
spike in the wage change interval 2–3%. Wage changes smaller than 2% are as
uncommon as nominal wage cuts during the period between May 2001 and May
2002. The spike in the wage change histogram in the interval 2–3% is hence
related to the automatic wage indexation and in eﬀect contributes to the down-
ward real wage rigidity that we observe. Additional factors might be necessary
to explain the high degree of downward nominal wage rigidity. For example,
high union power, fairness considerations or eﬃciency wages can all explain in
theory why employers do not lower nominal wages. Preliminary evidence from a
survey among Luxembourg ﬁrms conducted in the aftermath of the most recent
crisis period (i.e. when constraints preventing wage cuts might have become
more binding than in ordinary times) suggests that labour regulation/collective
agreements are among the most important reasons preventing nominal wages
from being cut in Luxembourg (Lünnemann and Mathä (2010) consider nine ob-
stacles to wage cuts).54 Conclusive evidence on the sources of downward wage
rigidity in Luxembourg will be the aim of future research based on micro wage
data incorporating the most recent crisis period.
6C o n c l u s i o n
This paper provides comprehensive microeconomic evidence on the degree of
downward wage rigidity in Luxembourg based on a monthly data set covering
all ﬁrms and employees between January 2001 and January 2007. We provided
estimates of both nominal and real downward wage rigidity, however, we focused
on the latter because it appears especially relevant in a country with full auto-
matic wage indexation (Lünnemann and Wintr (2009)). In order to assess the
robustness of our estimates, we adopted two sets of rigidity measures proposed
in the framework of the International Wage Flexibility Project. We also pro-
vided a cross-check based on two alternative measures to identify measurement
error, which, contrary to the IWFP procedure, make full use of the monthly
frequency of the dataset.
We show that the dataset is subject to two main types of measurement error
that would substantially lower the measured degree of downward wage rigidity.
While the raw data suggest that nominal wage cuts are not uncommon (overall
roughly 7.7% of all y-o-y wage changes in the baseline data set), we ﬁnd few
nominal wage cuts once adjusting for measurement errors (2.0–3.5% of all y-o-y
wage changes). Contrary to the evidence for many other countries, in the case
of Luxembourg, there is no apparent spike at zero in any of the wage change
54Labour regulation/collective agreements are the most important reason(s) preventing
wage cuts according to the mean and median score. In addition, roughly six out of ten
ﬁrms considered labour regulation/collective agreements very relevant in preventing wage
cuts. Other important obstacles to wage cuts during the recent crisis refer to their potential
impact on employees’ morale and eﬀort.40
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distributions. The distribution of wage changes is strongly asymmetric, and the
asymmetry is extending well beyond the zero bin. The most common interval
for wage changes is the 2–3% bin, which spans the 2.5% wage increase stipulated
by automatic wage indexation. In the empirical distribution, approximately one
in ten wage changes is smaller than 2%. After limiting measurement error, the
fraction of wage changes below 2% varies from 2.3% to 5.3% and we obtain
a quasi-left-truncated distribution. All three approaches limiting measurement
error suggest an even stronger concentration of wage changes on the 2% to 3%
interval (e.g. nearly half of all wage changes according to the break point test).
The evidence of a large spike in the wage change histogram around the ex-
pected inﬂation rate and lack of mass below suggests the case of DRWR. This
is conﬁrmed by the simple and model-based estimates. The latter conclude
that nearly every worker in Luxembourg is potentially subject to DRWR, a
particularly high level compared to the international evidence from the IWFP.
In addition, our results show that a strategy to circumvent wage indexation by
combining the obligatory wage increase with a nominal wage cut is not common.
These ﬁndings are robust to the procedure used to adjust for measurement er-
ror, to the method used for estimating wage rigidity and over the years in the
sample period.
We assessed whether the high degree of DRWR could be due to weak incen-
tives for ﬁrms to actually reduce labour costs in the absence of negative shocks.
In spite of very diﬀerent dynamics at the company level, there is no robust rela-
tionship between the fraction of (real and nominal) wage cuts and ﬁrm’s growth
(as proxied by the growth rate in total wage bill and head count). This suggests
that the observed downward real wage rigidity is not predominantly driven by
the absence of negative shocks.
The diﬀerences in the frequency of wage cuts and estimates of downward
wage rigidity across occupational groups and sectors are relatively small and in
most cases not signiﬁcant or can be related to speciﬁc deﬁciencies of a partic-
ular method. This suggests that the main driving factor of the high degree of
DRWR in Luxembourg covers basically the entire economy. We showed that
the spike in the wage change histogram in the interval 2% to 3% is related to
the automatic wage indexation which in eﬀect contributes to the downward real
wage rigidity. We cannot exclude that additional factors might be necessary
to explain the high degree of downward nominal wage rigidity. Preliminary
evidence from a recent survey among Luxembourg ﬁrms suggests that labour
regulation/collective agreements are among the most important reasons pre-
venting nominal wage cuts in Luxembourg. Conclusive evidence on the sources
of downward wage rigidity in Luxembourg will be the aim of future research
based on micro wage data incorporating the most recent crisis period.41
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Appendix
Table 4: Structure of the dataset, January-to-January wage changes
Baseline Cleaned AR Treatment
Obs. Pct. Obs. Pct. Obs. Pct.
Blue-collars 592176 42.8 162073 21.7 50275 13.8
White-collars &
Civil servants 790980 57.2 583246 78.3 312813 86.2
Private 1147700 83.0 538486 72.2 281463 77.5
Public 235456 17.0 206833 27.8 81625 22.5
0–14 empl. 269608 19.5 173487 23.3 142064 39.1
15–149 empl. 444357 32.1 215528 28.9 111730 30.8
≥ 150 empl. 669191 48.4 356304 47.8 109294 30.1
A+B 6124 0.4 2335 0.3 1387 0.4
C 1710 0.1 506 0.1 298 0.1
D 176419 12.8 66550 8.9 26583 7.3
E 5638 0.4 2635 0.4 861 0.2
F 146509 10.6 39559 5.3 20513 5.6
G 171513 12.4 84340 11.3 46531 12.8
H 45732 3.3 16168 2.2 8330 2.3
I 122950 8.9 69539 9.3 29521 8.1
J 177845 12.9 121904 16.4 64636 17.8
K 165444 12.0 91456 12.3 63650 17.5
L 184802 13.4 153475 20.6 66026 18.2
M 7848 0.6 5125 0.7 3012 0.8
N 92772 6.7 72936 9.8 20752 5.7
O 35844 2.6 18791 2.5 10988 3.0
2002 209331 15.1 96522 13.0 46562 12.8
2003 220118 15.9 125840 16.9 61439 16.9
2004 228569 16.5 134096 18.0 64476 17.8
2005 234924 17.0 137231 18.4 65512 18.0
2006 240229 17.4 136251 18.3 68114 18.8
2007 249985 18.1 115379 15.5 56985 15.7
Total 1383156 100 745319 100 363088 100
Notes: All data refer to January-to-January wage changes for job stayers. Branches are deﬁned
as follows: A: Agriculture, hunting and forestry; B: Fishing; C: Mining and quarrying; D: Man-
ufacturing; E: Electricity, gas and water supply; F: Construction; G: Wholesale and retail trade;
H: Hotels and restaurants; I: Transport, storage and communication; J: Financial intermediation;
K: Real estate, renting and business activities; L: Public administration and defence; compulsory
social security; M: Education; N: Health and social work; O: Other community, social and personal
service activities.45
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Figure 13: Fraction of wage cuts and ﬁrm growth










































































Note: BP (AR) refers to results obtained after limiting measurement error using the
breakpoint test (AR treatment). mgempl and mgbill denote the mean annual growth
rate of headcount and total wage bill per ﬁrm, respectively. The vertical axis captures
the fraction of wage cuts. Figures include only non-agricultural and non-energy private
ﬁrms with a minimum duration of 37 months in-sample and a suﬃciently high number of
wage changes (equivalent to a minimum of ten employees and one wage change per year
and employee on average).Working PaPer SerieS
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